We study how competing matchmakers use prices to sort participants into search markets, where they form random pairwise matches, and how equilibrium outcomes compare with monopoly in terms of prices, search market structure and sorting efficiency.
Introduction
Since the seminal work on network competition by Katz and Shapiro (1985) (see also Farrell and Saloner, 1986; Fujita, 1988) , there has been a growing economic literature on competing two-sided marketplaces. This literature reflects the importance of network externalities in industries ranging from telecommunications to credit cards and software platforms. In these industries, a competing marketplace is a network (platform) on which agents from the two sides of the market (e.g., viewers and advertisers, merchants and consumers, or software users and developers) interact. As in the earlier literature on networks, agents' choices of network have external effect on each other's welfare. However, the two-sidedness of the market raises several interesting issues which have only recently received attention. and Ellison, Fudenberg and Mobius (2002) deal with a central question in the literature of whether and when multiple marketplaces can coexist in equilibrium when network externalities are important. Caillaud and Jullien (2001; show how network providers compete by using the "divide-and-conquer" strategy of subsidizing one side of the market while recovering the loss from the other side. Rochet and Tirole (2003) provide a taxonomy of products and industries according to which side of the network (consumers or producers) are subsidized by networks in price competition, and compare price competition among network providers to the monopoly and planning outcomes. Armstrong (2004) emphasizes different implications on price competition between models of "single-homing," where consumers and producers must choose a single network, and models of "multi-homing," where network choices may not be exclusive.
Taken together, these papers have provided insights on price competition and guidance to regulatory policies in industries with network effects.
The network effect that is the driving force in the literature on competing two-sided marketplaces is the size effect. Some authors focus on the positive effect (thick market) that a larger network provides a greater chance of finding a trading partner, while others also allow for the negative effect (congestion or competition) that agents prefer to join networks where they expect to find fewer competitors. Although the size effect is important, in many industries network participants also care about the identities of other participants in the same network. For example, in many markets such as job search, real estate and dating, where networks are intermediaries, participants have heterogeneous qualities and networks differ not only in the relative size but also in the quality pool they attract. In these markets participants' network choices can have external effects on each other's welfare by changing the quality of the network pool as well as the size of the pool. This type of externality and its implications to price competition have been neglected in the literature on competing marketplaces, which focuses on the size effects and assumes either that agents are homogeneous or that agents' choice of network is independent of their type.
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This paper introduces a model of price competition among marketplaces in an environment where agents have heterogeneous qualities, and where the expected quality of the pool of participants affects agents' decision of which marketplace to join. In our model, a marketplace is a matching market with friction, or more specifically, a meeting place where participants randomly match with each other. We have in mind a job market or a dating market, where agents have private information about their one-dimensional quality characteristics (type), and where the match value function exhibits complementarities between types. Since type information is private, agents self-select into different search markets based on the prices and their expectations of the quality of the pool in the search market.
Under the assumption of complementarity, how agents sort into the search markets by type has implications to efficiency. The random matching search technology we adopt implies the absence of any size effect. This allows us to isolate the implications of the "sorting externality" introduced in this paper from the consequences of the much studied size effect.
The aim of the paper is to analyze how the outcome of price competition among matchmakers compare with the monopoly outcome and the social planner solution, in terms of prices, search market structure and sorting efficiency. In our model, matchmakers use prices (subscription fees) to induce agents with different types to sort into different search markets. Price competition in a matching environment with friction differs from 2 Ambrus and Argenziano (2004) modify the framework of Caillaud and Jullien (2001; and allow for heterogeneous preferences. Agents have the same quality but differ in terms of willingness to pay for participating in a larger network. In their model, the equilibrium distribution of participant types can be different across networks, however the size effect remains the only externality.
the standard Bertrand models because prices also play the role of sorting heterogeneous agent types into different search markets. Aside from the usual strategy of lowering price to steal rivals' market share, we identify a pricing strategy called "overtaking" that is unique to the sorting role of prices. Overtaking a rival is achieved by charging a price just higher than the rival does, and thus providing a market with a higher quality (average agent type). When the price difference is small enough, the rival's search market loses all its customers because quality difference dominates. The overtaking strategy is crucial for our result that the role of prices to facilitate sorting is compromised by the need to survive price competition. We show that the competitive outcome can be less efficient in sorting than the monopoly outcome.
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In section 2 we lay out the framework of duopoly price competition in a matching environment. We introduce the concept of search market structure, which is how agents sort into two search markets given the two prices. We borrow from a refinement concept in extensive games to select a unique market structure for any price profile. Price competition in our model takes the form of overtaking to provide higher sorting quality with a higher price, as well as undercutting the rival's price as in standard Bertrand competition. The benchmark cases of efficient market structure for a social planner and optimal market structure for a monopolist, each with two search markets, are presented in section 3. We show that the incentives of the monopolist to differentiate the two search markets are aligned with those of the social planner, but the total search market coverage (the mass of types served) by the monopolist may be smaller. In section 4, we provide the main results of the paper about price competition and sorting. We show that no pure-strategy equilibrium exists in the simultaneous-move pricing game, because by overtaking each matchmaker can drive the rival out of the market and increase the revenue. We provide a sufficient condition for the two matchmakers to coexist in the equilibrium of the sequential-move version of the pricing game. The first-mover has to create a niche market for the low types in order to survive the overtaking strategy of the second-mover, which in equilibrium serves the higher 3 Sorting efficiency is the subject of a recent paper by McAfee (2002) . He shows how most of the efficiency gains in sorting can be made with just two search markets. He does not consider the incentives of market participants.
types. The equilibrium outcome of the duopoly competition involves inefficient sorting, because the search markets created by the two matchmakers are insufficiently differentiated in terms of match quality. We conclude the paper in section 5 with some discussions about the robustness of our main results when more than two search markets are created.
A Duopoly Model of Competing Matchmakers
Consider a two-sided matching environment. Agents of the two sides have heterogeneous one-dimensional characteristics, called "types." For simplicity, we assume that the type distribution function is F for both sides, with a support [a, b] ⊆ IR + , and a continuous density function f . For notational convenience, we assume that b is finite, but our analysis applies to the case of infinite support with appropriate modifications. The two sides are assumed to have the same size.
A match between a type x agent and a type y agent from the other side produces a value of xy to both of them. This match value function satisfies the standard complementarity condition (positive cross partial derivatives). Agents are risk neutral and care only about the difference between the expected match value and the entrance fee they pay.
Unmatched agents get a payoff of 0, regardless of type.
Two matchmakers, unable to observe types of agents, use entrance fees to create two search markets. For each i = 1, 2, let p i be the entrance fee charged by matchmaker i. Each agent participates in only one search market, where they form pairwise matches randomly.
In each search market, the probability that a type x agent meets an agent from the other side whose type is in some set equals the proportion of search market participants whose type belongs to the set. For simplicity, we assume that search markets are costless to organize. The objective function of each matchmaker is to maximize the sum of entrance fees collected from agents.
Search market structures
For any pair of entrance fees p 1 and p 2 , agents have three participation strategies: participate in matchmaker 1's search market, participate in 2's market, and not participate.
We examine the Nash equilibria of the simultaneous move game played by the agents, and for concreteness refer to each equilibrium as a "search market structure." Since our model is symmetric with respect to the two sides, we restrict our attention to symmetric Nash equilibria, with each search market hosting an equal number of participants from the two sides of the markets. . One "singular search market structure," denoted as S 1 , is no agents participating in search market 2. The participation threshold c 1 for search market 1 is determined by
The above condition implies that the threshold participation type is either a type c 1 that is indifferent between participating in search market 1 and not participating, or the lowest type a, which strictly prefers participation. The other singular search market structure, denoted as S 2 , is no agent participating in search market 1; the participation threshold c 2 for search market 2 is similarly determined.
The prices p 1 and p 2 may also support a "dual search market structure," denoted as
, where types between c 1 and c 2 participate in search market 1 and types above c 2 participate in search market 2.
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This occurs if either there exist participation thresholds c 1 and c 2 , with a ≤ c 1 < c 2 , such that
In both cases above, the threshold type c 2 is indifferent between participating in search market 2 and in search market 1. In the first case, the threshold type c 1 is indifferent 4 When p 1 = p 2 we assume that the two matchmakers evenly split the types above the participation threshold; the analysis is unaffected by this assumption.
between participating in search market 1 and not participating at all, while in the second case, type c 1 is the lowest type a, which strictly prefers participating in search market 1.
Whether a pair of prices p 1 , p 2 with p 2 < p 1 supports a dual search market structure, denoted D 21 , is determined similarly.
The assumption of complementarity in the match value function implies that participation decisions are made according to threshold rules, such that the three choices, namely participating in search market 2, participating in search market 1 and not participating, are ordered from high to low, with the preference of any type between a higher choice over a lower one implying the same preference for any higher type. As a result, the two singular search market structures and the dual structure, together with the "null search market structure" where agents participate in neither search market, cover all possible equilibrium search market structures.
We now make an assumption that rules out multiple dual search market structures for given p 1 and p 2 . A sufficient condition for there to be at most one dual search market
in equations (2.2), this condition guarantees that c 2 is positively related to c 1 from the second equation while they are negatively related from the first equation, so that there can be at most one solution to the two equations; in equations (2.3) this condition guarantees that there is a single c 2 that satisfies the second equation. The derivative of µ(t, x ) with respect to t is given by
This derivative converges to 1 2 as x approaches t.
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Further, the derivative of ∂µ(t, x )/∂t with respect to x has the same sign as
with respect to t, given by
The derivative ∂µ(t, x )/∂t at x = t can be calculated using L'Hospital rule and solving for it from the resulting equation. It is equal to 1 2 because a continuous density is locally uniform.
converges to 1 2 as x approaches t, and is non-decreasing in x if f (·) ≤ 0. Non-increasing density is sufficient to imply that µ(t, x ) − µ(x, t) is non-decreasing in t as ∂µ(t, x )/∂t ≥ 1 2 ≥ ∂µ(x, t)/∂t. We make the following assumption.
Assumption A. The density function f is non-increasing.
For the analysis that we will carry out, we also need the standard assumption of monotone hazard rate. Let ρ(·) be the inverse hazard rate function. We assume that ρ (·) ≤ 0. This is equivalent to the assumption that the right tail distribution function 1 − F (·) is log-concave, which implies that the conditional mean function µ(t, b) satisfies dµ(t, b)/dt ≤ 1 (An, 1998) .
Assumption B. The hazard rate function of F is non-decreasing.
For any (x, x ) ⊂ [a, b] , let µ l be the partial derivative of µ(x, x ) with respect to x, and µ r be the derivative with respect to x . Then, the above two assumptions imply that 
Selection of search market structures
Unlike in standard Bertrand price competition, in a matching environment participation decisions of agents are not completely determined by prices. What an entrance fee buys for agents on one side of the search market depends on participation decisions by the agents on the other side of the market. Nash equilibrium alone does not pin down the search market structure. It is possible to have multiple search market structures for a given pair of prices. Indeed, from equations (2.1), for any p 1 , p 2 ∈ [0, b 2 ], either of the two singular search market structures S 1 and S 2 can be supported as equilibrium. Loosely speaking, S 1 is an equilibrium because the "belief" that no agents participate in matchmaker 2's market is self-fulfilling. In contrast, the dual search market structures cannot be supported by all price pairs. Before introducing a search market structure selection criterion, we first determine the range of prices that allow the dual search market structures to operate. 
, and equation (2.3) Since the agents in our matching model play a coordination game given the prices, a crucial ingredient in a selection criterion for singular search market structures is the specification of "out-of-equilibrium beliefs." Consider the singular search market structure S 1 .
Given the prices p 1 , p 2 and the expected type µ 1 in search market 1, it would be profitable for a type x agent to deviate to search market 2 if search market 2 is believed to have an (out-of-equilibrium) expected type µ 2 such that xµ 1 − p 1 < xµ 2 − p 2 . Borrowing from Banks and Sobel's (1987) theory of refinement in extensive games ("universal divinity"),
we say that a type x agent is "most likely to deviate" to search market 2 if the set of expected types µ 2 that induce the deviation is the largest among all types.
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We introduce the following definition. b] . By Definition 1, for the case where c 2 > a, S 2 is stable if and only if
and for the case where c 2 = a, S 1 is stable if and only if
From the definition of s(p 1 ) (equation 2.5), stability is equivalent to p 2 ≤ s(p 1 ).
We summarize the above results about the selection of the search market structure in the following lemma. Note that when p 2 ∈ [s(p 1 ), g(p 1 )], our selection criterion picks out the dual structure D 12 by excluding both S 1 and S 2 . By symmetry a unique search market structure is selected in the region where p 1 > p 2 . We refer to case (ii) in the following lemma as matchmaker 1 "undercutting" matchmaker 2, and case (iii) as matchmaker 2 "overtaking" matchmaker 1. 
Lemma 2. (i) S
where c 2 varies from a (at p 1 = a The strategy of overtaking is unique to the sorting role of prices. Overtaking a rival is achieved by charging a price slightly higher than the rival does to provide a search market with a higher quality. This induces deviation from the rival's search market by the highest type agents, which triggers further deviations by lower type agents. Thus, the overtaking strategy plays on the differences in willingness to pay for quality (average match type) between the highest and the lowest type agents participating in a market. When matchmakers are allowed to use more prices and create more search markets, the overtaking strategy becomes less effective because, as markets become shorter, the differences in willingness to pay between the highest and lowest participant in each market are reduced.
A more detailed discussion on the robustness of overtaking in a sorting environment with many prices is provided in section 5.
Our selection criterion can be thought of as a strengthening of trembling hand perfection in strategic-form games (Selten, 1975) . We will illustrate this point with the singular search market structure S 1 (the lower-priced search market). A Nash equilibrium is trembling hand perfect if it is a limit of totally mixed " -equilibria" where players are constrained to choose non-optimal strategies (tremble) with increasingly small probabilities.
Applied to our model, the convergence of non-optimal participation decisions of agents would generate an expected match quality µ 2 of matchmaker 2's market, which is what we have referred to as the out-of-equilibrium belief. Although the concept of trembling hand perfection itself does not impose any restrictions on how different types of agents might tremble, it is natural to require that a type x make the non-optimal decision of participating in market 2 more often than another type x , if x is more likely to deviate to market 2 than x (in the sense of having a larger set of expected type µ 2 that would make deviation optimal for x). Any tremble that respects this monotonicity requirement will generate a µ 2 that lies between the unconditional mean µ (a, b) , when all types tremble with the same probability, and b, when the type most likely to deviate (type b) trembles infinitely more often than other types, as in our selection criterion (Definition 1).
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A stronger monotonicity requirement in terms of a greater rate of increase in trembling probabilities for types 7 Myerson's (1978) proper equilibrium is also a refinement of trembling hand perfection, and is similar in spirit to our selection criterion. In a proper equilibrium each player trembles on his second best strategy infinitely more often than the third best and so on. The general idea is that more costly mistakes are made less often. Properness imposes restrictions on how a given player trembles among his non-optimal that are more likely to deviate, makes it more difficult to sustain S 1 as a stable equilibrium for small price differences, and brings the version of trembling hand perfection closer to our selection criterion. Further, our criterion is robust in the sense that independent of how strong the monotonicity requirement is, S 1 is stable if the price difference is large enough.
Monopolistic Sorting
In this section we examine the sorting efficiency achieved by a monopolist who can create at most two search markets. A benchmark is the constrained efficient search market structure, the choice of a planner who faces the same information constraints as the monopolist and who can use two prices to create two search markets to maximize the sum of expected match value. We consider the differences in the solutions for the planner and for the monopolist both in terms of total coverage of the two search markets and in terms of differentiation between the two markets.
The planner is assumed to maximize the total match value achieved by two search markets. The planner's maximization problem reflects the same two constraints faced by the matchmaker: the information constraint that agents' type is privately known and the technology constraint that at most two search markets can be created. As the monopolist, the planner has to use prices to give proper incentives for agents to sort into two search markets.
In the analysis of this section, it is more convenient to use threshold types instead of prices as choice variables for the planner and for the monopolist. This change of variables is valid. For any prices p 1 and p 2 , a unique search market structure obtains with their threshold types c 1 and c 2 , according to our selection criterion (Definition 1). Conversely, for any threshold types c 1 and c 2 , say c 1 ≤ c 2 , price p 1 is given by the indifference of type strategies, while our selection criterion imposes restrictions on how trembling on a given non-optimal action varies across different types of agents. Because trembling probabilities are specified according to how costly mistakes are to individual agents, proper trembling generally does not satisfy the monotonicity requirement. Detailed characterization of proper equilibria in our model is available upon request.
c 1 between the lower quality market and non-participation, and the price p 2 of the higher quality search market is given by the indifference of type c 2 between the two markets. For the monopolist, we argue that the revenue function is quasi-concave, i.e. the derivative crosses zero at most once and from above. First, if the optimal thresholdĉ is interior then it satisfies the first order condition
8 When c 1 = a, there are multiple prices p 1 that implement the same search market structure. However, the monopolist will always choose to bind the participation constraint of type c 1 in order to maximize the revenue, while any such price p 1 gives the planner the same total match value.
Since µ l (c, b) ≤ 1 by Assumption B, from equation (2.4) we have
for any c. Together with µ(c, b) > c, the first order condition (3.2) implies Following the standard price discrimination literature, we can define "virtual type" of
. The monopolist will never serve agents of negative virtual types. As shown in equation (3.4), at the monopolist's optimal thresholdĉ, the virtual typeĉ − ρ(ĉ) is strictly positive.
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In contrast, combining equation (3.1) with the inequality (3.3), we have that at the planner's efficient choice c * , the virtual type is negative (with possible exception when c * = a). Note that under Assumption B, the virtual type function c − ρ(c) is increasing, and so positive virtual type for the monopolist and negative virtual type for the planner confirm our result that the market coverage is generally smaller for the monopolist.
Market differentiation
Now we examine the original two-price problems of the planner and the monopolist. The planner chooses c 1 and c 2 , with c 1 < c 2 , to maximize the total match value:
The monopolist chooses c 1 and c 2 to maximize the revenue from the two search markets:
Fix c 1 and consider how the planner and the monopolist choose c 2 . Proof. For the planner, the first order condition with respect to c 2 is
For any c 1 , there exists at least one c * 2 that satisfies the above first order condition, as
Moreover, an increase in c 1 leads to a greater c * 2 , and we can write:
9 The result that the virtual type is non-negative for the monopolist does not depend on Assumption B. It follows immediately from the first order condition (3.2) as µ(ĉ, b) ≥ĉ.
For the monopolist, the first order condition with respect to c 2 is
The right-hand-side of equation (3.8) 
Q.E.D.
Comparison between c * 2 andĉ 2 for fixed c 1 reflects different incentives for the planner and the monopolist to differentiate search market 2 from search market 1. For both the planner and the monopolist, increasing c 2 raises the qualities (expected match types) in both search markets at the expense of reducing the relative size of the higher quality market (search market 2). The size effect is the same for the planner and for the monopolist, but the effects on the qualities are different because the monopolist is concerned with the change in the marginal type's willingness to pay, whereas the planner cares about the change in the average expected type. Unlike the comparison of market coverages in the one-price problem, the comparison between c * 2 andĉ 2 is sensitive to the type distribution. To see this, note that using the identity
we can rewrite the objective function of the planner as
and the objective function of the monopolist as 
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We regard the difference between c * 2 andĉ 2 as secondary to the difference in terms of market coverage. We have already seen from the previous analysis of one-price planner and monopolist's problems that market coverage is greater for the planner. Now we show that the same is true for the two-price problems.
Lemma 5. The efficient coverage c * 1 for the planner is at least as large as the optimal coverage for the monopolist.
Proof. The first order condition with respect to c 1 for the planner is:
Thus, there is a unique solution c *
Using the relation (3.7) between c * 2 and c 1 , we can show that the above holds because µ l (c 2 , b) < 1 and µ r (c 1 , c 2 ) ≤ 1 2 by Assumption A and Assumption B. Further, we can show that c * 1 ≤ c * (with equality only if c * = a), so that a planner with two prices available will expand the market coverage relative to a planner with a single price. This can be seen by comparing (3.11) to (3.1) and using the fact that µ(c 1 , c * 2 ) < µ (c 1 , b) .
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For the monopolist, the first order condition with respect to c 1 is:
11 Numerical examples of trapezoidal distributions (i.e., decreasing linear density with f (b) > 0) with either c * 2 <ĉ 2 or c * >ĉ 2 for given c 1 are available upon request.
12 It follows from equation (3.6) that c * 2 < b for any c 1 .
As in the case of one-price monopolist, the two-price monopolist will never serve any agent with a negative virtual type, i.e. at the optimalĉ 1 we haveĉ 1 ≥ ρ(ĉ 1 ).
To see this, note that ifĉ 1 < ρ(ĉ 1 ), then the right-hand-side of equation (3.12) is greater thanĉ 1 , implying
Since the revenue of the monopolist can be alternatively written as:
and since the monopolist can always choose c 1 just below c 2 to make the first term arbitrarily small, the inequality (3.13) implies that the monopolist is not choosingĉ 1 optimally, a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Therefore, as in the case of one-price sorting, the market coverage remains smaller for the monopolist than for the planner. We summarize the findings so far as the proposition below. We note that the comparison between the monopolist and the planner holds more generally. In the discussion section (section 5), we show that when more than two search markets can be offered, total market coverage is at least as large for the planner as for the monopolist. Under uniform type distribution, the monopolist has the same incentive to sort participating types.
Proposition 6. (i) Total market coverage is at least as large for the planner as for the monopolist; and (ii) monopolistic market differentiation is efficient given the total market
coverage if the type distribution is uniform.
Competitive Sorting
In this section we analyze the equilibrium outcome under duopolistic competition. We assume that the two matchmakers each choose a single price to maximize revenue. It turns out that no pure-strategy equilibrium exists in the simultaneous-move pricing game, because by overtaking each matchmaker can drive the rival out of the market and increase the revenue. Characterization of the equilibrium in the sequential-move pricing game is complicated by the need to consider both the search market structure where the first-mover serves the lower quality market and the symmetric structure. An additional complication arises, because unlike in the case of monopoly, we need to consider the sections in the dual structure regions where the participation constraint of the threshold type for the lower quality search market is not binding. Indeed, we will show that in some cases the only way for the first-mover to survive the overtaking strategy of the second-mover is to lower its price sufficiently to serve all lower types and leave some rents to the lowest type (type a).
The natural comparison is between the equilibrium outcome with two competing single-price matchmakers and the outcome with a two-price monopolist. We will make comparisons in terms of both market coverage and market differentiation, as these are the two factors that determine sorting efficiency measured by the total match value. From
Proposition 6, we know that the total market coverage is smaller for the monopolist than for the planner, while at least in the case of uniform type distribution, the market differentiation is the same. We will show that under competition the coverage is expanded but the quality difference is reduced relative to monopoly. The comparison in terms of sorting efficiency is thus ambiguous. We will give examples in which competition yields a smaller total match value than monopoly.
Simultaneous competition
Consider a static game where the two matchmakers choose prices simultaneously. In this subsection we show that feasibility of the overtaking strategy to each matchmaker implies that there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in prices.
Lemma 7. There is no pure-strategy equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game.
Proof. First, note that only a dual search market structure is a candidate for equilibrium outcome. This is due to the fact that given the competitor's price, say p 1 , the other matchmaker can always earn a positive profit by overtaking (charging a p 2 just above p 1 ).
This strategy drives the competitor out of the market and guarantees a positive revenue.
Second, in any dual search market structure, by using the overtaking strategy each matchmaker can earn a revenue strictly greater than the competitor, which is impossible. 
1). Comparing the two equations c µ(c , b)
, we conclude that c <c 2 for some slightly greater than zero. This implies that matchmaker 1 earns a strictly greater revenue in deviation than matchmaker 2 in the dual search market structure. Thus, feasibility of the overtaking strategy implies the impossible scenario that, in equilibrium, each matchmaker should earn a revenue strictly greater than the competitor.
Q.E.D.
The non-existence of pure-strategy equilibria in the simultaneous-move game points to a difference between competing matchmaking and the standard Bertrand price competition. Payoff discontinuities exist in both competing matchmaking and in Bertrand competition, and tend to homogenize prices in the absence of any asymmetry between the competitors. While in Bertrand competition this leads to marginal cost pricing, in competing matchmaking prices cannot be determined in a similar fashion because they also play the role of sorting.
Existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium can be established using the concept of payoff-security of Reny (1999) . Our simultaneous-move game is discontinuous, because the search market structure switches from one singular search market structure to the other one when prices move from below the diagonal to above (Figure 1) . However, by charging a slightly higher price each matchmaker can secure a payoff at worst only marginally lower against small perturbations of its rival's price. It follows that the mixed-extension of our simultaneous-move game is payoff-secure, and therefore a mixed strategy equilibrium in prices exists (Corollary 5.2 in Reny, 1999). 
Surviving overtaking
Rather than studying mixed-strategy equilibria in a simultaneous-move game, we look at pure-strategy (subgame perfect) equilibria in a sequential-move game. For the remainder of this section, we consider a game where matchmaker 1 first picks a price p 1 , and matchmaker 2 then chooses p 2 after observing p 1 . From our analysis of the simultaneous-move game we know that the sequential-move game gives an advantage to matchmaker 2 because it can secure a revenue strictly higher than matchmaker 1 through overtaking. We are interested in finding out whether this advantage is so overwhelming that matchmaker 1 cannot survive as a first-mover.
14 One hope for matchmaker 1 to survive overtaking is to choose a price so low that matchmaker 2 finds more profitable creating another differentiated search market rather than overtaking matchmaker 1 and drive it out of the competition. In the proof of the proposition below, we distinguish two cases: a > 0 and a = 0. We say that the type distribution is sufficiently diffused if µ(a, b) > 3 2 a. Note that the condition µ(a, b) > 3 2 a is automatically satisfied if a = 0. Intuitively, when the type distribution is sufficiently diffused, there is room for two matchmakers to coexist, because the lowest type's willingness to pay for a higher quality match is low relative to higher type agents. When matchmaker 1 posts a sufficiently low price, overtaking effectively entails serving the entire market. The opportunity cost of overtaking is high since by focusing on a more exclusive search market, matchmaker 2 could charge a much higher participation fee. 13 An additional condition needed for Reny's result to apply, reciprocal upper semicontinuity, is satisfied in our model, because the sum of the payoffs to the matchmakers is continuous.
14 If existence of such equilibrium fails, then there is a continuum of equilibria indexed by the price charged by the first-mover, where the first-mover earns zero revenue. 
Consider how matchmaker 2's revenue in the dual search market structure D 12 , given by p 2 (1 − F (c 2 )), changes at p 2 = s(p 1 ). Since c 2 = a at p 2 = s(p 1 ), the derivative of matchmaker 2's revenue with respect to p 2 at s(p 1 ) is given by 
So the derivative is positive if and only if
µ(a, b) − a + a f (a)(µ(a, b) − a) − 1 2 > f (a)s(p 1 ).(
Q.E.D.
A sufficiently diffused distribution allows the first-mover to survive overtaking by the second-mover by focusing on a lower quality "niche" market. Note that when a > 0, the survival strategy of charging p 1 < a 2 for the first-mover implies that all low types are served and some rents are left to the lowest type (type a) with a relaxed participation constraint. Further, the sufficient condition in the proposition for the existence of a dual search market structure depends on the type distribution only through the unconditional mean µ (a, b) . This is because at the boundary between the search market structures S 2
and D 12 , where p 1 is small and p 2 = s(p 1 ), the behavior of matchmaker 2's revenue is independent of the type distribution, and is locally identical to the behavior under the uniform type distribution. Later we will show that the condition is also necessary for the sequential-move game to have an equilibrium dual search market structure under the uniform distribution.
Niche market
Proposition 8 provides a sufficient condition for the two matchmakers to coexist in an equilibrium, by considering the second-mover's incentives to overtake the first-mover while ignoring the possibility that the second-mover may allow the first-mover to serve a higher quality search market in a dual structure. In this subsection we show that this latter possibility does not arise if the type distribution is uniform. The search market structure is D 12 in any duopoly equilibrium, i.e. matchmaker 1's niche market is the lower quality search market while matchmaker 2 serves the higher one. To establish the claim, we will
show that regardless of p 1 , it is never optimal for matchmaker 2 to allow matchmaker 1 to serve a higher quality search market.
For the following analysis, it is convenient to introduce some new notation. Recall that the optimal thresholdĉ for a one-price monopolist, is either a, or if it is interior, satisfies equation (3.2). Denote the corresponding optimal price asp, given bŷ ) ). That is, it is optimal for matchmaker 2 either to charge the highest price that supports the singular search market structure S 2 (overtaking matchmaker 1 by charging s(p 1 )), or to choose a price that allows matchmaker 1 to serve the lower search market and supports the dual search market structure D 12 . This is a candidate for equilibrium outcome with a dual search market structure, because matchmaker 1 can potentially earn a positive revenue (Proposition 8). To see this, first note that charging 
where by (2.1) c 2 satisfies c 2 µ(c 2 , b) = p 1 . (ii) Matchmaker 2 can undercut by charging
, the best undercutting price is
(p 1 ). The corresponding revenue is given by (p 1 )). We want to show that this is never optimal because either undercutting or overtaking would generate a greater revenue. This is the only place where the assumption of uniform type distribution is used. As the argument involves straightforward calculations, it is left to the appendix.
Q.E.D.
While the above result depends on the assumption of the uniform type distribution, the intuition behind it is more general. By charging a very low price, or a very high price, the first-mover makes the overtaking strategy unappealing to the second-mover. Both low and high prices deter overtaking and one would expect that, to survive overtaking, the firstmover will target a niche market, serving either a small fraction of high types or a small market of low types. A low price is also very effective against undercutting by matchmaker 2, while choosing a high price invites undercutting and makes the first-mover vulnerable.
What we have shown in this subsection is that under the uniform type distribution, when the first-mover charges a price high enough to deter overtaking, the second-mover will find it optimal to undercut. Thus, to deter undercutting as well as overtaking by the second-mover, matchmaker 1 has to find its niche market with low prices.
Price competition and sorting
The preceding analysis has prepared us to consider the effects of price competition on equilibrium sorting. Proposition 8 provides a sufficient condition for there to be an equilibrium with a dual search market structure by showing that with a sufficiently low price matchmaker 1 can induce matchmaker 2 to serve the higher quality search market rather than overtake matchmaker 1. Proposition 9 shows that with the uniform type distribution, in looking for an equilibrium with a dual search market structure, we need not consider the alternative search market structure where matchmaker 1 serves the higher quality search market. In this subsection, we ask how the equilibrium outcome compares with the optimal search market structure and pricing for a two-price monopolist.
First, we consider search market differentiation. In the dual search market structure can think of matchmaker 2 taking p 1 as given and choosing c 2 to maximize
where c 1 is determined by
Compare the incentive of matchmaker 2 to differentiate the higher search market from the competitor's search market, to that of a two-price monopolist to differentiate the higher search market from the lower one. The latter problem can be thought of as taking p 1 as given and choosing c 2 to maximize
where c 1 is determined in the same way as (4.4) or c 1 = a if aµ(a, c 2 ) ≥ p 1 . Equation (4.4) implies that the size of search market 1 shrinks as c 2 decreases. While the monopolist internalizes the cannibalization of lower search market, matchmaker 2 in the dual search market structure has no such consideration. As a result, at the optimal choicesĉ 1 andĉ 2 of the monopolist, the derivative of matchmaker 2's revenue with respect to c 2 is negative, implying that for the same total market coverage c 1 the equilibrium threshold for the higher quality market is lower than the corresponding monopoly threshold. In other words, there is less market differentiation under competition than under monopoly. Note that this comparison between monopolistic and competitive market differentiation is independent of the type distribution. Thus, we have established the following:
Proposition 10. In any equilibrium of the sequential-move game with a dual search market structure where the first-mover serves the lower quality market, the equilibrium outcome has less market differentiation than the optimal structure of a monopolist.
The above result can be strengthened when the type distribution is uniform. In this case, Proposition 9 implies that we can state Proposition 10 for any equilibrium in the sequential-move game with a dual search market structure. Further, by Proposition 6 the monopolist and the planner have identical incentives in choosing c 2 for a given p 1 . Thus, competition between the two matchmakers induces a smaller, and less efficient, degree of search market differentiation. This result will be used below to compare the sorting efficiency under competition and under monopoly.
Next, we consider the effect of competition on search market coverage and show that under competition the total coverage is at least as large as under the two-price monopoly.
We only need to establish the claim for the case where under competition c 1 is greater than a and determined by equation (4.4). Taking derivatives, we obtain from (4.4) Proof. When the type distribution is uniform, the condition in Proposition 8 reduces to a/b < 1 2 , which we already know is necessary for an equilibrium dual search market structure to exist. To establish the sufficiency of this condition, we assume a/b ≥ We can use (4.5) to verify that matchmaker 2's revenue maximization problem is concave in the c 1 > a section of the dual structure region D 12 . It follows that condition (4.7) is a necessary condition for matchmaker 2's best response in the dual search market structure to be interior, or equivalently, for there to be an equilibrium outcome in the sequentialmove game with a dual search market structure.
Q.E.D.

Welfare comparison
An implication of Propositions 10 and 11 is that the comparison between competition and monopoly in terms of sorting efficiency can be ambiguous, because competition expands the coverage but reduces the quality difference. To give some sense of the comparison between competition and monopoly, we concentrate on a parameter range of the uniform type distribution where the equilibrium outcome can be explicitly calculated. This is the range where in equilibrium the first-mover serves all types and leaves some rents to the lowest type.
We assume that
Denote , the best response of matchmaker 2 in terms of c 2 can be found by revenue maximization. It is given by:
Given the above best response, the optimal price p 1 for matchmaker 1 is given bỹ The corresponding equilibrium price is
We are ready to compare the total match value under competition and under the two-price monopolist. The total match value is given by (3.5). Under competition, the equilibrium thresholds are given byc 1 = a and (4.9). The total match value is:
Under the monopolist, the optimal thresholdsĉ 1 andĉ 2 can be solved from the first order condition with respect to c 1 (3.12) and the first order condition with respect to c 2
, and the corresponding total match valuê
For reference, we also compute the total match value under the planner. The efficient thresholds c * 1 and c * 2 can be solved from the first order condition with respect to c 1 (3.11) and the first order condition with respect to c 2 , which is the same as for the monopolist. 2 , the equilibrium outcome has a lower total match value than the monopoly outcome.
Discussions
One important restriction in the present model of competing matchmaking is that each matchmaker is allowed to use only one price and create one search market. This restriction may be justified by the cost of setting up search markets in an actual matching environment, but we have made the assumption to simplify the analysis. It is important, however, to understand whether relaxing this assumption would qualitatively change the conclusions of the paper.
The results of section 3 on comparing monopolist and planner in terms of search market coverage and differentiation turn out to be robust to the restriction to two search markets. In a companion paper (Damiano and Li, 2004) , we consider the problem of a monopoly matchmaker that uses a schedule of entrance fees to sort different types of agents on the two sides of a matching market into exclusive search markets, where agents randomly form pairwise matches. That paper has a more general setup than section 3 of monopolistic sorting in the present paper, with asymmetric type distributions and unrestricted number of search markets. Under the assumption that the match value function exhibits complementarities, matching types at equal percentiles maximizes total match value, so that the planner would want to create one search market for each type. In contrast, the monopolist maximizes the expected sum of virtual match value, defined as the product of virtual match type x − ρ(x) for each type x and the match quality that type x gets.
16
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the revenue-maximizing sorting to be efficient; these conditions require complementarities in the match value function to be sufficiently strong along the efficient matching path. By the results of Damiano and Li (2004) , in the present paper Assumption B is sufficient to imply that the monopolist unconstrained in the number of search markets has the same incentive as the planner to perfectly sort all participating types (i.e. one market for each participating type). Moreover, under Assumption B, the monopolist will never serve agents of negative virtual types, while the optimal market coverage for the planner is complete, implying that the market coverage for the monopolist is at most as large as the planner. Although suggestive of the robustness of our results in section 3, these implications from the results in Damiano and Li (2004) do not directly apply in the present paper due to the restriction to a finite number of search markets. We provide a formal argument for the robustness of the results in section 3 by assuming the type distribution is uniform.
16 Rayo (2002) studies how a monopolist can use price discrimination to sell status goods. His problem can be interpreted as a special case of the matching model of Damiano and Li (2004) 
where c N +1 = b. The first order condition with respect to c i , i = 2, . . . , N , is
and is given by equation (3.11) for c 1 . As in the two-price case, the above first order conditions can be characterized recursively, starting from i = N . For the uniform type distribution case, these relations are given by:
for each i = 2, . . . , N . In other words, the thresholds are evenly spaced given any market b] . It then follows from the first order condition (3.11) with respect to c 1 that
implying full market coverage eventually as N increases. For the monopolist, the objective is to maximize the revenue
Under the uniform type distribution, market differentiation takes the same form as for the planner, so equation (5.1) holds for the optimal thresholdsĉ i . The first order condition with respect to c 1 takes the same form as in the two-price case, given by (3.12), and for the uniform case reduces to
As N increases,ĉ 1 decreases and becomes arbitrarily close to
In considering price competition in section 4, we have adopted the simplest environment where price competition interferes with the sorting role of prices by assuming that each of the two matchmaker can create only one search market. It turns out that the result of inefficient sorting under competition (Proposition 10) is robust, but that the extent of sorting inefficiency depends on the number of search markets. In the extreme case when matchmakers can create an arbitrarily large number of search markets, and hence perfect sorting of all agents is possible, price competition would not lead to inefficient sorting.
The intuition for why inefficiency disappears when the number of search market can be arbitrarily large, is that if a matchmaker is already perfectly sorting all agents by offering a continuum of search markets with an appropriate price schedule, the competitors can only increase their market share by offering to perfectly sort agents at a lower price. In other words, when a price schedule that induces perfect sorting is offered, the overtaking strategy becomes completely ineffective. To see this, suppose that there is a continuum of search markets, one for each type, offered either by a single matchmaker, or by a continuum of matchmakers. The pricing schedule must be such that each agent maximizes its payoff by choosing the search market designed for his type. More precisely, if q(x) is the price for the type-x search market, then perfect self-selection is guaranteed if q (x) = x for each type x in [a, b] . Imagine that an entrant to the market introduces a new search market with a The result of efficient sorting under competition with an unconstrained number of search markets is anticipated by our discussion in section 2.2. There we stressed how the overtaking strategy turns on the differences in willingness to pay for quality between the highest and the lowest type agents participating in a search market, to induce higher types to deviate which triggers further deviations by lower types. In the limit case when agents are perfectly sorted, the type distribution in each search market is degenerate and, without any heterogeneity among the participants, the overtaking strategy completely loses its power. In contrast, as long as types are not perfectly sorted, overtaking is possible. To see this, suppose that there is an active search market with a subscription fee p that has a non-degenerate type distribution. Then, this market can be overtaken by an entrant with a new search market with a price p just above p. This follows because the type that is most likely to deviate is the highest type in the search market. Since the type distribution in the search market is non-degenerate, there is a price p just above p such that the highest type strictly prefers the new search market. By Definition 1, the present search market structure is unstable.
When perfect sorting is not feasible, overtaking is effective and price competition interferes with sorting. When choosing their pricing structure, each matchmaker fails to internalize its effects on the market share of his competitors, thus leading to sorting inefficiency. How compelling is the assumption of imperfect sorting ultimately depends on how heterogeneous we think agents are. If only a few types of agents can be profitably distinguished, perfect sorting is likely to be feasible and the beneficial effect of competition will unlikely to be reduced by the drawback of sorting inefficiency. In contrast, when the type space is very rich, it is unlikely that sufficiently many search markets can be created to perfectly sort all agents, either because the cost of market creation is too high the types, with x i < x j for i < j. Then the only stable search market structure is a set of prices p i , such that p 1 = 0 and p i+1 = p i + x i (x i+1 − x i ) for i = 1, . . . , N − 1. It is not possible to overtake any search market because the prices are constructed so that for any deviating price p slightly above p i for each i, the type most likely to deviate is exactly x i but type x i strictly prefer to stay in its current search market. It is not possible to undercut any search market either, because for any p slightly below p i , the type most likely to deviate is x i−1 , which by construction strictly prefers to stay in its current search market.
or because the presence of some size effect makes thin search markets unattractive. In this environment of rich type space the benefits from sorting are largest, and we can expect a monopolist to induce a more efficient search market structure than competitive matchmakers.
Appendix
In this appendix we complete the argument for case (iv) in the proof of Proposition 9. (p 1 )). We refer to the revenue given by (4.2) as the "maximum overtaking revenue," and the revenue given by (4.3) as the "maximum undercutting revenue" for any p 1 . Note that the maximum overtaking revenue decreases with p 1 , while the maximum undercutting revenue increases in p 1 . In addition, because for fixed p 2 < p 1 as p 1 increases c 2 either decreases or does not change and c 1 increases (see equations (2.2) and (2.3), with the roles of the two matchmakers reversed), matchmaker 2's maximum revenue as a duopolist in the D 21 region is increasing in p 1 .
The proof relies on two claims. The first claim is that there is a critical price p such that for any p 1 ≥ p matchmaker 2's maximum revenue as a duopolist is achieved at the boundary between S 2 and D 21 . Thus, the maximum revenue as a duopolist coincides with the maximum undercutting revenue for any p 1 ≥ p. Note that matchmaker 1 makes zero revenue. The second claim is that at p 1 = p the maximum undercutting revenue, which equals the maximum revenue as a duopolist, is smaller than the maximum overtaking revenue. For any p 1 < p, the maximum revenue as a duopolist is achieved in the interior of the D 21 region, but it is smaller than when p 1 = p because as a function of p 1 it is increasing. Since the maximum overtaking revenue is decreasing in p 1 , it follows from the second claim that the maximum revenue as a duopolist for any p 1 < p is smaller than the maximum overtaking revenue at the same p 1 .
It will be helpful to refer to Figure 1 (equation 2.6). Letp = b(b − µ(a, b) ) + aµ (a, b 
